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U.S. airlines have lost nearly $60 billion (2009 dollars) in domestic markets since deregulation, most
of it in the last decade.  More than 30 years after domestic airline markets were deregulated, the dismal
financial record is a puzzle that challenges the economics of deregulation.  I examine some of the most
common explanations among industry participants, analysts, and researchers -- including high taxes
and fuel costs, weak demand, and competition from lower-cost airlines.  Descriptive statistics suggest
that high taxes have been at most a minor factor and fuel costs shocks played a role only in the last
few years.  Major drivers seem to be the severe demand downturn after 9/11 -- demand remained much
weaker in 2009 than it was in 2000 -- and the large cost differential between legacy airlines and the
low-cost carriers, which has persisted even as their price differentials have greatly declined.
Severin Borenstein
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University of California, Berkeley
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and NBER
borenste@haas.berkeley.eduIn 2008 and 2009, U.S. passenger airlines reported aggregate net losses, before extraor-
dinary income and charges, of $14 billion on revenues of $270 billion.1 About 76% of
the losses were on domestic U.S. operations, which have been deregulated since the fall of
1978. Most international routes remain more heavily regulated, and generally more lucra-
tive for those carriers that are permitted to serve them. The very poor ﬁnancial results in
2008-2009 again sparked discussions of why the airline industry has fared so badly since
deregulation. From 1979 through 2009, U.S. airlines lost $59 billion (in 2009 dollars) on
domestic operations.2
Figure 1 shows net income on domestic operations for the industry since 1979, scaled
by the size of operations (available seat-miles).3 It illustrates that the losses have been
dramatically worse in the last ten years than in the previous two decades of deregulation.
In fact, in 2009 dollars, domestic passenger airline operations lost $10 billion from 1979 to
1989, made proﬁts of $5 billion in the 1990s and lost $54 billion from 2000 to 2009. To
put these numbers in context, at the end of 2009, the entire book value of U.S. passenger
carriers’ assets was about $163 billion and the book value of shareholder equity was $10
billion. Even at the end of the 2000, after six consecutive proﬁtable years, their assets
were $159 billion and shareholder equity was $40 billion (all in 2009 dollars).4
Three decades after deregulation the industry’s ﬁnancial track record is dismal. This
isn’t what economists, analysts or industry participants predicted in 1978. It is a puzzle to
industrial organization economists and a challenge to the views of deregulation advocates.
The puzzle is compounded by the fact that the industry saw robust investment until 2001
and has seen only modest disinvestment in the ﬁnancially disastrous 2000s. From 1979 to
2001, the U.S. airline passenger ﬂeet grew in every year, by an average of 4.9% per year
1 The earnings ﬁgures I report throughout this paper exclude asset writedowns, pension settlements, reor-
ganization costs and “fresh start” accounting adjustments, which are often associated with bankruptcies
and mergers. Including these adjustments does not change the basic picture, but causes large swings
in year-to-year reported earnings that are not attributable to market activities in the speciﬁc year.
Capital gains and losses from fuel hedging are generally included in operating expenses (evident in
average fuel purchase prices that diﬀer substantially from the market price), not extraordinary income
and charges. These data include only U.S. carriers that receive at least $1 million per quarter from
passenger revenues, so they exclude cargo carriers such as UPS and Fed Ex. See the Appendix for a
list of the carriers included. The net income before extraordinary charges does include debt payments
and taxes. All references here to earnings, net income, proﬁts and losses use this measure. In terms of
DOT income statement accounting, this is “net income” minus “other net income”.
2 The losses are slightly larger, $67 billion, when international operations are included.
3 See the appendix for details of all calculations for ﬁgures.
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Figure 1: Net Income (/ c2009) per Available Seat-Mile: U.S. Domestic Markets
measured by aircraft and 3.6% per year measured by aircraft-seats.5 The ﬂeet size peaked
in 2001. From the end of 2001 to the end of 2008 (latest available date), aircraft and
aircraft-seats declined by 1.7% and 1.4% per year respectively.
Borenstein & Rose (2008, henceforth “BR”) addressed the volatility of airline proﬁts,
showing that ﬂuctuations in demand and fuel prices along with ﬁxed capital costs and
sticky labor costs can explain the industry’s earnings volatility. But that analysis did
not address the level of proﬁts, the fact that the domestic airline industry has reported
negative net income in 23 of 31 years since deregulation and a strongly negative aggregate
net present value of earnings. There is no conventional long-run equilibrium explanation for
an industry that perpetually loses money, but there are a number of disequilibrium theories
that have been suggested by industry participants, ﬁnancial analysts, and researchers. In
this short paper I discuss these theories and attempt to narrow down the range of plausible
explanations.
5 These aircraft data cover domestic and international operations of nearly all U.S. passenger airlines
operating 19-seat and larger aircraft. As suggested by this diﬀerence, the average size of commercial
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Figure 2: Average Ticket Tax
I. Exogenous cost drivers: taxes and fuel
Industry leaders argue that the tax and fee burden on airline tickets is excessive, today
including a 7.5% ticket tax and fees of $6.20 per segment ﬂown. In addition, many airports
impose passenger facilities charges (PFCs) of up to $4.50 on each passenger boarding a
ﬂight at the airport. One can argue about whether these taxes are excessive given the
government costs of supporting the industry, but it is diﬃcult to see how these would
lead to losses for more than a short transitional period. Figure 2 shows that the average
tax (including federal ticket taxes and PFCs) as a percentage of the base ticket price has
climbed steadily, and is today about twice as high as when it was 8% through most of the
1980s.6 But the average dollar tax per ticket (in 2009 dollars) is today at about the same
level it was in the proﬁtable late 1990s.
Over the last 30 years, the primary form of taxation has transitioned from strictly a
percentage excise tax to a mix of percentage and per-segment taxes. In the 1980s, the
entire ticket tax was a percentage of the ticket value. The passenger facility charges were
added in the early 1990s, the segment tax in 1997 and the September 11 security fee in
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Figure 3: Real Average Ticket Price Relative to 1979 (adjusted for average trip distance)
(inclusive of government taxes/fees and average airline baggage and ticket-change fees)
early 2002, all based on the number of ﬂights the passenger boards, regardless of the fare
paid. As a result, as real fares have declined, dropping signiﬁcantly after the September
11 attacks, the tax burden increased as a percentage of the base fare.7
The problem seems to be not that taxes have risen, but that the base fares have fallen
and stayed so low. Even the post-9/11 tax increase has mostly reverted in real terms.
Figure 3 shows the average ticket price relative to 1979, adjusted for inﬂation and trip dis-
tance (which has increased substantially over time).8 While taxes and fees have changed
incrementally, the industry scale has changed massively. In the standard long-run ad-
justment dynamics, it seems that the industry should have been able to achieve the scale
change necessary to incorporate and pass through these taxes. My own research in progress
suggests that changes in passenger facilities charges are nearly entirely passed through to
customers within two quarters.
7 The substantial fee increase in early 2002 raised revenue for signiﬁcantly expanding security services
after 9/11.
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Figure 4: Jet Fuel Price ($2009)
Fuel costs increases have certainly been a signiﬁcant component of losses in some years,
most obviously 2008. Over the deregulation era, however, oil costs were highest in the ﬁrst
7 years and the most recent 5 years, over $40 per barrel in 2009 dollars, and much lower
during the 19 intervening years. Figure 4 shows that from 1986 to 2004 the average jet
fuel price was below $1.40 per gallon — relatively stable and much lower than in the early
period of deregulation. Yet, the industry still lost money in 13 of those 19 years and on
net lost $31 billion in 2009 dollars.
While there is no question that the airlines earnings are aﬀected in the short run by
extreme oil price ﬂuctuations such as occurred in the last few years, there doesn’t appear
to be a barrier to capacity adjustment over 3 to 6 months in response to oil price changes.
The rapid reductions in schedules in the second half of 2008 make that clear.
Still, reducing ﬂight schedules doesn’t eliminate costs if those costs are ﬁxed or sticky.
In times of growing demand, carriers can adjust fairly smoothly to unanticipated cost
increases by growing more slowly, without having to ground aircraft or reduce workforce
size. When demand is stagnant or declining, however, rescaling operations in response to
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Figure 5: Implied Domestic Airline Demand and Real GDP, Relative to 1979
II. Exogenous demand shocks
The role of demand shocks in airline losses is most notable in 2001-02 and in 2008-09.
Prior to 9/11, however, it appears that domestic demand grew fairly steadily. Inferring
demand shifts from average yield and revenue passenger-miles, demand changes are pre-
sented in ﬁgure 5.9 Demand increased by 110% from 1979 to 2000, growing in 16 of those
21 years. Yet, the industry made money in only 8 of those years and overall lost $3 billion
($2009) over this period. The economic downturns during this period certainly aﬀected
airline industry proﬁts, but we wouldn’t expect investors to believe that demand growth
would be completely constant and steady. It is hard to see how unanticipated demand
shocks during this time could be a credible explanation for the overall poor performance.
Demand shocks are a more plausible explanation for the losses of the 2000s. The post-
9/11 demand drop, which was about 20% from 2000 to 2002, was unprecedented. By 2008,
demand was still about 3% lower than it had been in 2000, and then it dropped about 11%
in 2009. Because of the ﬁxed capital costs and sticky labor costs, the decade of depressed
demand was accompanied by a decade of depressed prices. In real terms prices were 20%
9 I follow the same basic approach as in BR, but use a price measure that adjusts for average trip distance.
See the appendix for further explanation.
7lower in 2009 than in 2000 (adjusted for trip distance) despite the fact that jet fuel prices
were about $0.59 per gallon (52%) higher, which, based on 2009 revenue passenger-miles
per gallon of fuel, raised overall costs by about 9%.
The other notable change in domestic service over this period was the increase in average
passenger load factor from 71% in 2000 to 81% in 2009. This was a continuation of the very
steady increase in the 1990s from about 60% in 1990 (and most of the 1980s). The increases
are mostly independent of demand shocks, rising or holding constant in every year except a
2% downward tick after September 11, which was completely reversed by 2003. Increased
fuel costs would make higher load factors more economic, but there is no evidence that the
load factor increases have been greater during periods of rising than periods of falling fuel
costs. More likely, load factor increases have been a result of improving yield management
technologies.
III. Entry and expansion of low-cost carriers
Many industry observers and participants point to low-cost (and low-fare) carriers
(LCCs) as part of the reason for low industry proﬁts, but there is wide disagreement
on what the connection is. If LCCs are simply oﬀering a lower-quality product, then their
diﬀerentiated product should ﬁnd its niche in the market if there is suﬃcient demand for
that quality level, yielding an equilibrium with both types earning normal returns.
Among industry and labor leaders, a common view is that new low-cost entrants and
LCC incumbents have made excessive capacity investments during growth periods, and
sometimes even during downturns, that have depressed prices for all. In order to discour-
age excessive investment, the largest airline pilots union has called for increasing capital
requirements as part of FAA licensing of new airlines.10
But the evidence doesn’t appear to support the idea that new entrants or older LCCs
are more prone to over-investment than the legacy airlines. Figure 6 presents the aircraft-
seat ﬂeet size of LCCs and non-LCCs (including legacy carriers and regional carriers who
generally operate as codeshare partners to the legacy carriers). Two things are clear
from this ﬁgure. First, LCCs in aggregate have experienced no more erratic ﬂeet size
adjustments despite being less well-established on average.11 In fact, they continued to
10 If LCC’s were more inclined to overinvestment, we would expect their ﬁnancial performance to be worse
on average and to be more volatile than legacy carriers. That doesn’t seem to be the case as discussed
below.
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Figure 6: Aircraft-Seats in Fleet
grow gradually even after 9/11 while remaining much less unproﬁtable than the legacy
carriers, as shown later. If anything, it appears to be the legacy carriers who are more
prone to over-investment relative to the growth of their traﬃc. Second, the changes in ﬂeet
size of the LCCs is dwarfed by the variation of the non-LCC ﬂeet, suggesting that LCC
investment decisions have not been the primary driver in industry capacity changes.12
An alternate view of LCCs is that they have been gradually chipping away at the en-
trenched positions of legacy carriers that have much higher costs. The change has been
gradual, because the legacy carriers are also protected by network marketing programs
and other activities that raise barriers to entry by more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Potentially exclu-
sionary activities of legacy carriers include frequent-ﬂyer and corporate discount programs
that exchange discounts for customer loyalty on a portfolio of unrelated routes,13 as well as
by American Airlines, in both cases transferring LCC ﬂeets to the control of legacy carriers. Similarly,
the decline in 2007 is a result of the US Airways-America West merger.
12 These ﬁgures include entire carrier ﬂeets, some of which are used on international routes, but the
conclusion is not changed if the analysis is limited to narrow-body aircraft, which are used primarily
for ﬂights within North America.
13 Severin Borenstein (1996) discusses the potential anti-competitive eﬀects of such repeat-buyer programs
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Figure 7: Domestic Market Share of Low-Cost Carriers (by revenue passenger-miles)
relationships with airports that allow large incumbents to restrict the availability of gates,
landing slots and other resources to potential entrants.
LCCs have been growing steadily since the early 1990s. Figure 7 shows their domestic
market share, by revenue passenger-miles since 1979.14 LCCs now compete (deﬁned as at
least 10% passenger share) on over 60% of all airport pairs, and over 80% of all city-pairs
if one assumes that the diﬀerent airports in Dallas, Houston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, New York, and Washington DC are in the same markets.
And LCCs have much lower costs than the legacy carriers. Figure 8 shows the operating
cost per available seat-mile adjusted for average ﬂight distance (or “haul”) length.15 Ad-
justed for the average ﬂight distance, legacy carrier costs have remained 30%-60% higher
than the LCCs for nearly all of the deregulation era, averaging about 40% higher in the
last decade.
The cause of this persistent cost diﬀerence is an area in need of further research. Fuel
14 The downticks in 1986, 1987 and 2008 are from legacy carriers absorbing the operations of LCCs.












1 9 7 9
1 9 8 0
1 9 8 1
1 9 8 2
1 9 8 3
1 9 8 4
1 9 8 5
1 9 8 6
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
1 9 9 0
1 9 9 1
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 4
1 9 9 5
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
Legacy & Regional Carriers Low-Cost Carriers
Figure 8: Average Operating Costs (/ c2009) per Available Seat-Mile
(adjusted for average ﬂight length)
costs are approximately the same for all airlines. Wages for ﬂight attendants and ground
crew at Southwest airlines are about comparable to those for similar staﬀ at legacy carriers,
and pilots of comparable aircraft are paid about the same. That may not be true for some
of the other LCCs, however. I am not aware of an analysis that incorporates full beneﬁts
packages including pensions. Work rules are clearly more ﬂexible at Southwest and the
other LCCs, and employees in general are assigned to a wider array of activities, probably
leading to higher labor utilization. Aircraft utilization is higher at Southwest than at
legacy carriers, though it would be valuable to study how that has changed as Southwest
has expanded to airports with more congestion and weather disruptions. Quality factors
also diﬀer — on-time rates, passenger complaint rates, legroom, seat assignment policies,
among other factors. When all of these factors are considered, however, it is not clear
which carriers have the high-quality product in domestic markets.
While the cost diﬀerential between LCCs and non-LCCs has remained large, the average
price diﬀerential has been shrinking, as shown in ﬁgure 9. Figure 9 is adjusted for the
average trip distance of passengers ﬂying on each type of carriers.16 LCC fares have
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Figure 9: Price Premium of Non-LCCs Over LCCs (adjusted for trip distance)
declined much less than those of legacy carriers in the 2000s, reﬂecting in part their lower
burden of excess aircraft capacity. This is no doubt a large part of the reason that LCCs
have suﬀered much milder losses in the 2000s, as shown in ﬁgure 10.17
IV. A series of unfortunate events?
Demand and cost shocks have certainly played a signiﬁcant role in the airline industry’s
poor ﬁnancial results, but there is little reason to think those disruptions will be less
frequent in the future. Furthermore, after more than 30 years, it seems unlikely that
airline losses are due entirely to a series of unfortunate exogenous events relative to what
management and investors should have expected.
Throughout deregulation, the legacy carriers have maintained much higher costs than
LCCs, but the price premia they have been able to charge have gradually declined over
the last 20 years, shrinking by more than 60% over that time. As a result, while the
17 These data include the roughly $2 billion Southwest airlines net proﬁts during 2006-2009 from hedging
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Figure 10: Domestic Net Income (/ c2009) per Available Seat-Mile for Non-LCCs and LCCs
exogenous demand and cost shocks have aﬀected all carriers, the legacy airlines have fared
much worse ﬁnancially, and LCCs have grown steadily.
The response of legacy carriers has been to expand their networks through mergers and
alliances. There is little evidence that such moves narrow the cost gap with LCCs, but
network expansion may help diﬀerentiate their products and improve service. It also may
increase their ability to use network marketing devices to dampen LCC competition.18
The airline ﬁnancial performance has improved substantially in 2010 and the industry
seems likely to be close to break-even on domestic operations for the year. Still, the
experience of the last decade suggests that until legacy carriers can either close the cost
gap with LCCs or increase the price premium they maintain, they will likely have diﬃculty
earning consistent proﬁts through the typical cycles in the airline business environment.
This short paper obviously doesn’t settle the issues surrounding airline proﬁtability. I
believe that the topic would beneﬁt from much more investigation by industrial organiza-
tion economists.
18 There is a lengthy literature on the impact of airline alliances that expand network eﬀects. See Armantier
& Richard (2008) and citations therein.
13Appendix
For the analysis in this paper, I include the following carriers: Legacy: (American, Alaska,
Braniﬀ (pre-1990), Continental, Delta, Eastern (pre-1992), Frontier (pre-1987), Frontier
(post-1994), Northwest, Ozark (pre-1987), Pan Am, Piedmont (pre-1998), Republic (pre-
1998), TWA, United, US Airways, Western, Trump, National (pre-1983), Hawaiian, Aloha,
Regional: Air Midwest, Air Wisconsin, American Eagle, Atlantic Coast, Atlantic South-
east, Business Express, CCair, Chautaqua, Colgan, Comair, Commutair, Continental Ex-
press, Express Airlines, Great Lakes Aviation, Gulfstream Int, Mesa, Mesaba, PSA Air-
lines, Skywest, Trans States Airlines, Midwest Express, Horizon, Pinnacle, Business Ex-
press, Westair, Republic, Shuttle America, GoJet, Compass, and Low-Cost Carrier:
Paciﬁc Southwest (pre-1989), Air California (pre-1988), Air Florida (pre-1985), Airtran,
America West, JetBlue, Midway, Morris, New York Air, People Express, Southwest, Spirit,
Sun Country, Valujet, Reno Air, Jet America, Virgin America, Allegiant, USA3000, Amer-
ican Trans Air, Kiwi, National (post-1998), Western Paciﬁc, World). All airlines are in-
cluded in aircraft capacity data. Some of the very small airlines are not included in the
ﬁnancial and traﬃc data.
All price level adjustments are to 2009q4 using the all-urban Consumer Price Index.
Figure 1: USDOT Bureau of Transportation Form P-12 for income statements and Form
T-1 for ASMs. See http://www.transtats.bts.gov/.
Figure 2: Author’s calculations from USDOT BTS Origin & Destination Survey (DB1A
and DB1B) and eﬀective dates of ticket tax changes. PFC changes are available at
http://www.faa.gov/airports/pfc/monthly reports/media/airports.xls . See ﬁgure 3 de-
scription for adjustment made to account for baggage and change/cancellation fees.
Figure 3: Based on the “Market Data” Dataset, which is derived from DB1A/DB1B and
is described at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/borenste/mktdata.htm. After adjusting
all prices to 2009q4, for every quarter, I estimate the OLS regression
AvgPricercnt = α0t + α1tNSDistr + α2tNSDist2
r +  ,
where an observation is all of the passengers ﬂying route r on “carrier set” c with n coupons
in the trip during quarter t. Each trip is a one-way journey between two airports that may
be one-coupon (no change-of-plane) or two-coupon (one change-of-plane at an intermediate
airport. Both directions on the route are collapsed into the same observation. Round-trips
are broken into two one-way observations. The carrier set is a single carrier observation
for one-coupon trips. It is the pair of carriers for two-coupon trips (which are often the
same carrier on both coupons). NSDistr is non-stop distance between the airports. The
regression is weighted by passengers in each observation. On average, each regression
includes 80,000 observations covering about 7 million passengers, with more observation
and passengers in later years I then calculate the ﬁtted values for the tickets sold in the
same quarter one year later,
ˆ AvgPricercnt =ˆ α0t−4 +ˆ α1t−4NSDistr +ˆ α2t−4NSDist2
r,
14and calculate the ratio of aggregate revenues actually paid to the aggregate revenues cus-
tomers would have paid if they had paid the ﬁtted value price based on the year-earlier re-
gression parameters. These price do not include baggage fees or ticket change/cancellation
fees. So, for each quarter, I calculate
Ticket Revenues+Baggage Fees+Change/Cancellation Fees
Ticket Revenues
for domestic operations of all passenger carriers included in the analysis (from Form P-12).
The change in this ratio from one quarter to the same quarter in the following year is used
to rescale the revenue change for each quarter. I aggregated the revenue diﬀerence over
each year to get the annual change in prices.
Figure 4: USDOE Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=A503600002&f=M
Figure 5: Demand is assumed to be Q = AtP   for all years, t with   = −1. Real P is
taken from the calculations for ﬁgure 3. Q is aggregate domestic revenue passenger-miles
(from USDOT BTS Form T-1). Figure 5 presents At by year.
Figure 6: USDOT BTS Form B-43
Figure 7: USDOT BTS Form T-1
Figure 8: USDOT BTS Form P-12 for income statements and Form T-1 for ASMs. The
adjustment is done by ﬁrst estimating the regression






γt +  
on annual carrier-year data (for all commercial passenger airlines with at least 20 depar-
tures per day in the year) for 1979-2009 where δ are ﬁxed carrier eﬀects and γ are ﬁxed year
eﬀects. The opexp/ASM for LCCs is then normalized to the average haul length of legacy
carriers in the same year by multiplying by
ˆ α0+ˆ α1ln(AvgHaulleg,t)+ˆ α2∗(ln(AvgHaulleg,t))2
ˆ α0+ˆ α1ln(AvgHaulLCC,t)+ˆ α2∗(ln(AvgHaulLCC,t))2
for each year, where ˆ α0 =5 .16, ˆ α1 = −1.92 and ˆ α2 =0 .122. The adjustment for haul
length makes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence up to the mid-1980s when LCCs ﬂew much shorter
distances than legacy/regional carriers, but makes almost no diﬀerence in the last decade.
Figure 9: Author’s calculations based on “Market Data” dataset (see ﬁgure 3 description).
This calculation corrects for route distance in much the same way as for ﬁgure 3, but the
regression is run only on legacy plus regional carrier observations and the out-of-sample
prediction and comparison is for LCC carriers. For every quarter, I estimate an OLS
regression of average fare on route distance and distance squared using only data from
legacy and regional carriers. I then calculate the ﬁtted values for the LCC observations and
the aggregate revenue diﬀerence if LCC customers had paid the ﬁtted value price instead
of the actual LCC price they did pay. The correction for baggage and change/cancellation
fees is similar to ﬁgure 3.
Figure 10: USDOT BTS Form P-12 for income statements and Form T-1 for ASMs
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